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ABSTRACT
Conventional monetaiy policy rules based on intermediate targets, like the growth of
money or credit, rest on the presumption that relationships correcting these variables to key
measures of nonfinancial economic activity like income and prices are robust. \Vhen financial
markets change in such a way as to disrupt those relationships, rules based on intermediate
targets no longer provide useful guides for conducting monetary policy.Under those
circumstances, the central bank can instead exploit variables like money and credit as information
variables. Doing so, however, inevitably requires case-by-case judgments. The greater is the
impact of changing financial markets in this context, the stronger is the need for the central bank
to exploit information both inclusively, in the sense of drawing on multiple and diversified
sources of information rather than any one variable, and intensively, in the sense of allowing less
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There is no human affair which stands so
constantly and so generally in close connection
with chance as war . .Pitythe poor warrior
who is contented to crawl about in the beggardori
of rules.
Karl von Clausewitz, On War
It may be true that war is the human activity most vitally subject to
chance and happenstance, but monetary policy surely runs a close second. Making
decisions and taking action in a setting driven by the unknown and the
unknowable are a large part of what the making of monetary policy is all about.
The central thesis of this paper is that Clausewitz's warning against the
straight-jacket of predetermined rules in waging war is no less apt in the
conduct of monetary policy
The more specific ocus of this paper's argument is the largely
unanticipated, indeed unanticipatable, changes that have occurred in recent
years -- andthat continue to occur and, in all likelihood, will keep on
occurring --inthe U.S. financial markets. Enumeration and description of
particular changes in market structure or practice is not the point, however.
Rather, the paper's object is to provide an overview, or more accurately a point
of view or perhaps even a in regard to the implications of such
changes for the design of monetary policy.-2-
The central tenet of that point of view or philosophy of the matter, is
that such changes are, and for the foreseeable future will be, ever-present and
ongoing, to a sufficient extent as to vitiate any attempt to achieve a
successful monetary policy by following a rule based on a pretedermined
intermediate target. This view stands in specific contrast to the idea that a
distinct set of market changes has occurred but has also now concluded, so that
the financial and economic relationships most relevant to monetary policy will
soon "settle down" to reflect some newly prevailing equilibrium. This paper's
argument is that such an equilibrium may exist in some suitably fundamental
sense, but not at the level of workaday detail and operational explicitness
required to underpin a formal procedure, like that surrounding the use of an
intermediate target, capable of appropriately governing monetary policy.
What too often seems forgotten in the endless debate over how to conduct
monetary policy is that the question crucially at issue is not whether a
sufficiently clever econometrician, surveying the reckage after the fact, can
devise some new specification, or invent some new variable, capable of restoring
order to a collapsed relationship. What matters is whether it is possible to
identify before event a set of regularities of sufficient centrality and
robustness to provide the qualitative and quantitative basis for sound
policymaking. Even a careful reader of the voluminous literature of this
subject might well infer that a positive answer to the former question somehow
implied a favorable resolution of the latter. ?ut the two issues are distinct
and it is the latter that must carry the weight of actual policymaking.
Section I provides the necessary context for what follows by briefly
reviewing the motivation and logic underlying the use of information variables
and intermediate targets in formulating and carrying out monetary policy. A
novel feature of this dfscussjon, compared to much of the usual literature of-3-
the subject, is the importance attached to the frequency in time over which a
central bank revisits its choice of target, both qualitatively and
quantitatively. When the time between such reconsiderations is lengthy, the use
of any intermediate target becomes indistinguishable from a fixed (that is,
no-feedback) rule. But when the time interval is short, what is formally the
same procedure amounts in substance to a quite different approach based on an
information variable. Section 1 also highlights the importance, under either an
intermediate target procedure or an information variable procedure, of empirical
links between the specific variable in question and nonfinancial economic
activity.
Sections II and III turn to empirical evidence, documenting the collapse in
recent years of some of the familiar relationships that, if they were
sufficiently robust, could perhaps play a central role in guiding U.S. monetary
policy. As a way of making more explicit the connection between these changes
in empirical economic relationships and the changes that have taken place in the
U.S. financial markets, Section III focuses on three "case study" examples: the
narrow money stock (Ml), which was at the center of the Federal Reserve System's
most intensive effort to date to pursue monetary growth targets, during 1979-82;
a broad credit aggregate, which my ownworkof a decade ago showed was
comparable to most measures of money in its relationship to income; and the
broad money stock (M2), which in recent years seems to have attracted more
support as a target for U.s. monetary policy than any other such variable.With
respect to M2 in particular, this paper argues that today the Federal Reserve
not only does not know the magnitude but does knth.j.gnof the
response of M2 to open market operations.-4-
Finally, Section IV cakes up th. b'ird question of how to conduct monct.cv
policy In an environment "so constantly and so generally in close connection"
with chance and change. Even the traditional injunction to do less when matters
are uncertain, and in the limit do nothing at all when they are uncertain
enough, has no meaning when basic relationships are so subject to change that it
Is impossible to say what "doing nothing" means In operational terms. Yet the
federal Reserve must somehcw execute to the best of Its ability Its
responsibilities, both statutory and morn!, to further the common veal. The
approach suggested here involves the use of information variables that are
Inclusive rather than exclusive --encompassingmeasures not only beyond th
conventionalmonetary aggregates but, indeed, beyond the confines of the bankini'
system or even the financial markets more generally --togetherwith a frequency
of decision making that for practical purposes renders even a single formal
Intermediate target substantially equivalent to an Information variable.
Section V concludes by pointing to some valid and potentially Important
concerns, stemming from ongoing change in the U.S. financial markets, that
remainbeyond the scope of the subject's treatment here.-5-
I.Tarets, Instruments InformationVariables
In principle, the Federal Open Market Committee could conclude each of its
meetings by issuing a directive simply instructing the Committee's operating
arm,thesecurities trading desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to do
whatever is appropriate to make the U.S. economy grow at such-and-such percent
per annum, or to limit price inflation to no more than such-and-such percent.
The FOMC does not act in this way, presumably because the decisions thus taken
would not be sufficiently operational. In other words, they would leave to the
trading desk staff the entire matter of just what to do in order to achieve the
specified growth rate, or the designated inflation.
One can, of course, imagine such a division of responsibility between staff
and principals. But the Open Market Committee has never (to my knowledge) even
come close to adopting that division, perhaps because the Federal Reserve System
itself, as an institution, already stands in roughly this kind of relationship
to the Congress. Moreover, economic growth and inflation are subject to many
influences besides monetary policy, and many of those are surrounded with great
uncertainty. Actual results may therefore differ from the corresponding
intended outcomes despite even the best actions cx ante by monetary policy.
Without at least some judgment about the plausible means to the designated ends,
made either before the fact or after, how could the principals on the Committee
ever determine whether their appointed staff had acted appropriately and
comptly?
At the other extreme, the Open Market Committee can also make decisions
couched entirely in terms of quantities or prices that the trading desk's
actions alone are sufficient to establish, either because desk actions are all
that matters (as in the case of nonborrowed reserves) or in the sense that desk
actions can readily be made dominant over other market forces, at least for a-6-
while (as in the case of the federal funds rate). The Committee has pursued
approximately this kind of narrow focus on the instruments of monetary policy at
various times in the past, and such an interpretation, with the funds rate as
the designated instrument variable, seems not far off the mark as a description
of the most recent period. Once the Committee itself makes what amounts to the
choice of instrument -.meaninghere not just the qualitative selection of which
instrument to set but also the quantitative magnitude to be implemented --
responsibilityfor whether that choice is the right one clearly rests with the
principals.
Both the Federal Reserve System and many of its critics, however, have long
sought to frame the FOMC's decision making process in terms that are
intermediate between these two extremes. One often stated reason is external:
the desire, on the part of both the Congress and interested private citizens, to
monitor the Federal Reserve's intentions and competence along just the lines
suggested above in regard to the Open Market Committee's relationship to its
staff. If the economy performs in a patently undesirable way, is that the fault
of monetary policy? Or was monetary policy appropriate ex ante and the poor
outcome due to unforeseeable circumstances beyond Federal Reserve control -.
likea surprise price increase imposed by the OPEC cartel, or a stock market
crash that dampened the public's spending, or credit stringency following large
loan losses taken by banks and other lenders?
But much of the motivation for a more intermediate monetary policy decision
making framework has also been internal in the simple sense of enhancing the
likelihood of achieving more desirable ultimate outcomes. Regardless of whether
it is left to staff or carried out by principals, and regardless too of whether
the matter is drawn explicitly or merely left implicit, the process of
establishing the policy instrument that is most likely to lead to any desired-8-
central banks can and do observe.
The specific aspect of intermediate behavior that has traditionally
received the most attention in this context is the accuisulation of money
balances. Given that the central bank's main form of policy action in a
fractional reserve banking system is the purchase or sale of securities in
exchange for bank reserves, even quite disparate accounts of the behavioral
process connecting monetary policy to economic activity provide at least a
potential role for fluctuations in some measure of "money" to anticipate
fluctuations in income, output and spending (either real or nominal). In the
most conventional rendering, open market purchases provide reserves that enable
banks to increase their lending and thereby create more deposits, thus reducing
interest rates (as long as the demand for deposits is negatively interest
elastic) and so stimulating spending. A closely related alternative version
places more emphasis on the importance of bank lending in financing either
business or household expenditures, so that movements in money anticipate
spending primarily because they reflect what is happening on the other side of
the banking system's balance sheet. A quite different view focuses initially on
the presumed link between money and prices, associating any effects on real
activity with the output decisions of producers unsure of how to interpret the
limited information they receive as prices change.
In each of these representations, the behavior that ultimately generates
changes in real economic activity and/or prices also involves movements of
money," and if the timing is right the FOMC can exploit those movements as a
means of checking, and if warranted changing, its chosen level for the federal
funds rate or the quantity of nonborrowed reserves. The most straightforward
way to do so is simply to compare the observed level (or growth rate) of "the
money stock" to prior expectations, formulated in conjunction with the originaleconomic outcome involves tracing backward a causal trail that leads (in the
forward direction) from what the central bank does to what happens to
nonfinancial economic activity. Along that causal trail, central bank action
and economic effect are separated .thbytime by behavioral process. A
change in the federal funds rate or in the quantity of nonborrowed reserves now
makesa difference for economic activity later on, theeconomic behavior
that gives rise to that ultimate difference involves actions along the way that
are, at least in principle, observable. The concept of either an intermediate
target for monetary policy or an information variable rests on both the time lag
and the observability of steps along the way (and, of course, on the fundamental
presence of uncertainty in the first place).
It is important to emphasize the joint and mutually reinforcing role played
in this context by both the passage of time and the occurrence of observable
intermediate behavioral actions. If the implementation of a new federal fund.s
ratein the morning had its full effect on income and prices by lunch time,
there would be little practical interest (at least for policy purposes) in
policy works, the underlying economic behavior does involve steps alongthe way
-- rangingfrom financial actions like taking loans or making deposits, to
nonfinancial actions like placing orders or obtaining building permits -- that
-7-
monitoring what happened along
outcomes, the FOMC could change
were no way to observe what was
funds rate change had occurred,
"wait it out" with whatever rat
wait might be long indeed. In
however, it does take time for
on economic activity. And, at
the way. Confronted by undesirable economic
policy the same afternoon. similarly, if there
happening until the full economic impact of a
the Counnittee would have little choice but to
e level seemed appropriate ex ante, even if the
the world that confronts actual monetary policy,
central bank actions to achieve their full effect
least under most conceptions of how monetary-9-
instrument choice. More money (or a faster growth rate) than expected might
mean that monetary policy is having a more stimulative effect on economic
activity than anticipated. Or it could mean that, while monetary policy is
having the anticipated effect, some independent influence -- fiscalexpansion,
for example, or a stock market rally -- isproviding more stimulus than
anticipated. Either way, the indicated response would be to tighten monetary
policy by raising the funds rate or reducing (the growth of) nonborrowed
reserves. Such a procedure amounts to using "money" as an information variable.
periodically exploiting its relationship to economic activity to make mid-course
corrections in the chosen policy instrument as needed, rather than simply wait
until the ultimate effect on income and prices has itself become fully evident.1
Under most conceptions of how central bank actions affect the economy, of
course, movements in money are not always a sign of movements in income and
prices to come. More money (or a faster growth rate) than expected might
instead mean that bank customers are simply choosing to hold larger deposits in
place of alternative forms of wealth, for reasons unrelated to their spending or
production decisions. Or it could mean that banks have decided that a smaller
cushion of excess reserves is appropriate to newly prevailing market conditions.
Whenever the FOMC uses "money" (or any other observable quantity or price, for
that matter) as an information variable to help guide monetary policy, it must
inevitably make judgments about just such matters in order to decide whether,
and if so by how much, to react when the chosen information variable behaves
unexpectedly. When the Committee's judgments are right more often than not,
using an information variable in this way can help it to achieve more desirable
outcomes, although it does little to further the interest of those who seek to
monitormonetary policy externally.
ycontrast,the Committee could eschew making such judgments on a case by-10-
case basis and instead simply decide that it will always react to unexpected
movements in money as if they convey information about nonfinancial activity
that warrant a change in the funds rate or in nonborrowed reserves. The
limiting case of this manner of proceeding is not only to treat all unexpected
money fluctuations as informative in this sense but also, as a quantitative
matter, to react to any such unexpected movements by changing the policy
instrument in such a way as to offset them altogether (or to the maximum extent
possible). If the FOMC had initially thought such-and-such percent money growth
was consistent with achieving its objectives for income and prices, but incoming
data has shown faster growth, the Committee would thus respond by raising the
funds rate or withdrawing reserves to the extent now thoughtnecessary to
restore money growth to just that originally designated rate. In this case, the
Committee would be using money not merely as artinformationvariable but,
further, as an intermediate target --inthe sense that it is, for some period
of time, conducting monetary policy as if its objective were not to influence
nonfinancial economic activity but to achieve a designated rate ofmoney growth
(which, of course, is more straight forward for outsiders to monitor).
But for what period of time is that? In the vast literature discussing
targets and instruments of monetary policy, analysis of this kind of
intermediate target procedure typically does not designateany specific time
interval for which the intermediate target is in force. Forpurposes of formal
analysis, doing so is perhaps beside the point. But the substantive force of an
intermediate target depends crucially on the length of time during which
achieving a particular target actually governs the conduct of policy.
For example, suppose the FOMC determines that achieving its objectives for
nonfinancial economic activity is likely to be consistent withmoney growth of
such-and-such percent, and further resolves not to revisit this matter for the-11-
next year. Instead, during that time it will conduct open market operations
solely with an eye to achieving its chosen rate of money growth. Such a
practice would clearly distinguish this use of money as an intermediate target,
not just as a formal matter but in substance as well. Throughout the year the
Committee would, in effect, be conducting policy under the presumption.
quantitative as well as qualitative, that the open market response appropriate
to offsetting any unexpected movements of money is also the response Appropriate
to offsetting any unwanted fluctuations in nonfinancial economic activity.
By contrast, suppose the Committee adopts what is formally the same stance
but also resolves to revisit the matter, including making a fresh assessment of
whether the initially designated money growth rate is still consistent with the
desired nonfinancial outcomes, after just one month. Here money may still be
the intermediate target of monetary policy, in the sense that its movements
govern open market operations within that month. ut as a substantive matter
the Committee is addressing, regularly and frequently, the very same questions
-towhat extent does the latest movement in money say anything about income or
prices? and what rate of money growth seems most consistent with achieving
whatever is now the desired path of income and/or prices? -.thatarise when
money is just an information variable.
As a substantive matter, therefore, whether the designation of a specific
intermediate target for monetary policy really amounts to what the literature
has associated with such a procedure depends importantly on the length of time
for which it is in force. In one direction, longer time intervals give the
intermediate target procedure substantive content. Indeed, as the interval
becomes long enough, pursuing an intermediate target becomes indistinguishable
from following a fixed money growth rule without feedback. In the other
direction, shorter time intervals render an intermediate target substantively-12-
equivalent to an information variable.
Just where today's FOHC practice stands along this spectrum is ambiguous.
As a rhetorical matter, under the Humphrey-Hawkins legislation the Committee
reports targeted growth rates (actually ranges) to Congress for an entire year
at a time, with an opportunity to revise these targets at mid-year. A year is
presumably long enough to lend substantive content to an intermediate target
procedure in this context. As a practical matter, however, both the observed
outcomes and the Chairman's statements to Congress clearly show that the
Committee feels no imperative to meet its designated targets if it judges doing
so to be inappropriate. In this presumably more important sense, money is
clearly serving as (at most) an information variable, not an intermediate
target.
Regardless of whether the Committee uses "money" -- orany other variable
-- asan intermediate target or just an information variable, however, two basic
requirements remain. The quantity or price in question must be observable And
its movements must provide information about subsequent movements of income, or
output, or prices, or whatever aspect of nonfinancial economic activity monetary
policy seeks ultimately to affect. When changes in market structures or
practice render a variable unobservable (as implied, for example, by the
familiar claim that there is some concept of "money" that continues to be
closely related to income or prices, but whith does not correspond to any
measure that could be revealed by the available data), or when such changes
sever a variable's empirical relationship to nonfinancial economic activity so
that its movements are no longer predictive, that variable's usefulness for
purposes of monetary policy is ended. But on both counts, that is an empirical
matter.-13-
II.Evolviriz Markets ChaninsEmpiricalRelationships
Financial markets, both in the United States and elsewhere have undergone
vast changes over time. In the United States during the past two decades, the
markets for deposits and deposit-like instruments have been a particularly
dramatic focus of change. Banks, thrifts and other competing institutions,
acting in response to relaxed government regulation as well as to new
opportunities opened by technological advances in communications and data
processing, have widely introduced new forms of wealth holding that either did
not exist at all, or at best were available only by special arrangement for very
large accounts, just a short time before. The deposit-holding public, including
businesses as well as household accounts both large and small, have responded in
turn by massively shifting their patterns of deposit ownership. All this is, by
now, highly familiar and well documented.2
From the perspective of what matters for monetary policy, the single most
fundamental aspect of this sweeping change in deposit institutions has no doubt
been the abolition, virtually at a stroke, of the long-standing distinction
between saving balances and transactions balances. At least since the l880s
(Jevons, for example), economists have distinguished the desire to hold money as
a repository of wealth from the desire to hold money as a means of consummating
purchases. And at least since 1933, when the Class-Steagall Act prohibited
payment of interest on demand deposits, this conceptual distinction had
corresponded in the United States to a readily visible division between
different forms of deposits actually offered by banks. But in the new world of
money market mutual funds, money market deposit accounts, and other instruments
combining market-related interest rates and checking services, it is now
standard practice for depositors to make the same account balance serve both
functions.14-
Norhas the scope of change within the last decade or two been limited to
institutions and practices affecting the public's asset holding behavior.
borrowing arrangements. too, have become sharply different. The change in this
regard that has probably been of greatest significance to links between monetary
policy and nonfinancial economic activity is the securitization of residential
mortgages and subsequent establishment of a highly liquid secondary market for
the resulting securities. This development has effectively severed the link
between mortgage financing and deposit flows, a link that had previously enabled
the Federal Reserve (acting in conjunction with other regulatory bodies) to
exert particular influence over the pace of homebuilding by setting market
interest rates either above or below the maximum interest rates legally payable
on deposits. The ceilings that used to limit deposit interest rates are now
mostly gone, but in all probability their presence today would make little
difference for the cyclical variability of homebuilding because securitization
has made available to mortgage borrowers virtually the entire market of saving
flows, not just those that pass through depositor)' intermediaries.
The more general erosion of the position of depositary intermediaries, of
which mortgage securitization is just the most obvious example, is potentially
of paramount importance for the way in which the Federal Reserve System conducts
monetary policy. Atleastunder current institutional arrangements, the Federal
Reserve's functional role in this context is as the monopoly provider of
reserves in a fractional reserve system encompassing banks and other depositary
intermediaries. But if the intermediary sector itself atrophies in relation to
the economy's overall systems for holding wealth, executing transactions and
mobilizing saving to finance expenditures, that functional role correspondingly
withers in its importance and effectiveness for the determination of
nonfinancial economic activity.-15-
Figure1 shows that the share of total wealth holding in the United States
represented by depository intermediaries' liabilities has recently declined
sharply (mostly because of the collapse of the savings and loan industry) after
well over a decade of relative stability. Even so, these institutions' share in
total wealth holding is approximately what it was two decades ago, and well
above what it was three decades ago. By contrast, Figure 2 shows that the share
of debt financing done by depository intermediaries has been declining for the
last two decades, and at a more rapid rate in recent years. These institutions'
share in total debt financing is well below any recent benchmark.
No one knows just how small reservable (or potentially reservable) deposits
must become in relation to total wealth, or how small the assets of depository
institutions must become in relation to total credit, before the central bank's
ability to affect these institutions' behavior by providing reserves no longer
translates into an ability to affect broader aspects of economic activity. But
the limiting point is surely not zero, and it is implausible not to expect the
relevant associated relationships to change, perhaps subtly but perhaps more
dramatically, well before that point is reached.
And change they have. Table 1 reports the results of standard empirical
exercises testing whether the respective growth of any of the usual money or
credit aggregates conveys information about nominal income growth in the United
States, apart from what is already known from past income growth itself and from
past movements of the federal funds rate. The table presents F-statisticsfor
tests, based on quarterly data across different time periods, of the null
hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the lagged growth of the specific






























































































































































F-STATISTICS fl NOMINAL INCOME EQuATIONS
ACGRECATE 1960:2-1979:3 1979:4-1992:4 1970:1-1992:4
Ml 4.98*** 79 .56
M2 2.07* 1.67 1.14
M3 2.68** 1.07 2.31*
Loans 4.50*** .56 1.46
Credit 4.70*** .71 .22
Note: Estimated regressions include four lags on each of
nominal GD?, the federal funds rate and the aggregate
shown. Nominal CDP and the aggregate are expressed in
logarithms. All variables are in first differences.
significantat the .01 level
** significantat the .05 level











































































































































































wherey and isare,respectively, the logarithms of nominal gross domestic
product and the aggregate indicated; r is the federal funds rate; u is a
disturbance term; and a and the • and5 are all coefficients to be
estimated.3 The five aggregates considered are the narrow (Ml). broad (M2) and
broader (M3) money stocks, bank loans, and total debt of domestic nonfinancial
borrowers.
Thefirsttime period considered in Table 1 is 1960:2-1979:3. that is. from
the earliest time for which the Federal Reserve provides data corresponding to
Its current definitions of the monetary aggregates until the point when it
introduced new operating procedures for monetary policy. The end of the 1970s
also marked theapproximateonset, or the acceleration, of many of the changes
in private-sector financial markets that have distinguished the more recent
period. As the F-statistics presented in the tabit make clear, during 1960-79
.c.h of the five aggregates considered contained information about future
nominal income movements that was statistically significant at the .10 level or,
in most cases, better. By contrast, for the period since then (1979:4-1992:4)
flQ Qn. of the five aggregates does so. Further, this sharp differenceis not
simply an artifact of the shortness of the second sample. Except for M3, which
Is just significant at the .10 level, the same result emerges when the time
period under consideration also includes the entirety of the l970s
(1970:1-1992:4).
The scope and import for monetary policy of changes like those documented
in Table 1 should not be underestimated. For the FOMC to use any of these
aggregates even as an information variable, much less as an intermediate target,- 17-
itmustknow qualitatively that a relationship between the aggregate and
nonfinancial economic activity existsitmust know at least something
quantitatively about what that relationship is. If the F-statistics for 1979-92
(or even 1970-92) showed the existence of such relationships, then the relevant
questions for policy purposes would be whether they were the same as (or similar
to) the ones that had prevailed earlier on, end if not then whether (or how) the
Open Market Committee in the past could have inferred the new relationships once
they were established, and whether the Committee can now have sufficient
confidence in these relationships going forward to exploit them for policy
purposes. But since the F-statistics in fact show no such relationships in the
first place, none of these questions arises, and certainly not the issue of
exploitation for purposes of monetary policy. What could it mean to use an
information variable that provides no information? Or to have an intermediate
target that is not demonstrably intermediate? What is left of the familiar
argument that monetary policy should be conducted according to fixed rules in
order to render the economic environment more predictable for private economic
decision makers, if the economic outcomes that matter to private decision makers
bear no predictable relationship to the variable on which the monetary policy
rule is based?
It is always possible, of course, that any or all of these aggregates may
bear a usefully informative relationship to the movement of either real income
or prices separately, but that that relationship is obscured here by combining
real income and prices into the single measure of nominal income.
Traditionally, the most fundamental theory of "money" in economics has
emphasized the link to prices, leaving implications for real activity to more
specific treatments embcdying impediments to Walrasian equilibrium that may be
realistic but rest on weaker foundations nonetheless.4 By contrast, much of the-18-
fluctuationsin money anticipate fluctuations in real output.5 Either kind of
relationship would potentially be useful for purposes of monetary policy, in
that the FOMC as a standard matter indicates its concern for both price
inflation and real outcomes.
As Tables 2 and 3 show, however, such is not the case. Table 2 presents
F-statistics, analogous to those in Table 1, for the f3 coefficients in
autoregressions of the form
(2)Ax—m+m+T r +6x +p
where x and p are the logarithms of real gross domestic product and the
corresponding price deflator, respectively, and all other variables are as in
(1).Table 3 presentsanalogous F-statistics for a further set of
autoregressionsthat are identical to (2) except that p replaces x as the
dependent variable. As is well known, none of these aggregates conveys
statistically significant information about subsequent movements of real incore
once the relationship allows for the effects of interest rates (here represented
by the federal funds rate). That was true before 1980, and it has been true
since. Before 1980 most of these aggregates did convey such information about
subsequent movements of prices. (Interestingly, M2 is the exception.) In more
recent samples only M3 and (surprisingly) bank loans have done so.
Changes of the scope and magnitude illustrated in Tables 1-3 are unlikely
to be mere accident. Instead, these changes in statistical relations have 'ore
likely resulted from changes in economic behavior, presuiiably including -- and
perhaps especially including -- justthe kind of changes infinancial market
structureand practice that are at issue here.TABLE
F-STATISTICS flREALINCOME EQUATIONS
AGGREGATE 1960:2-1979:3 1979:4-1992:4 1970; 1-1992:4
Ml .82 1.18 1.32
M2 .92 .65 .14
M3 1.18 .18 .10
Loans 1.18 .55 .22
Credit .55 .59 .78
Note: Estimated regressions include four lags on each of
real COP, the COP price deflator, the federal funds
rate and the aggregate shown. Real COP, the deflator
and the aggregate are expressed in logarithms. All
variables are in first differences.
***significantat the .01 level
** significantat the .05 level
* significantat the .10 levelTA8LE
F-STATISTICS flj PRICE EQUATIONS
AGGREGATE 1960:2-1979:3 1979:4-1992:4 1970:1-1992:1.
Ml 4.99*** 1.06 .38
M2 1.44 1.33 1.36
M3 2.22** L13 2.96**
Loans 3.85*** 2.73** 3.60***
Credit 4.32*** .55 .65
Note: Estimated regressions include four lags on each of
real CDP, the GDP price deflator, the federal funds
rate and the aggregate shown. Real CD?, the deflator
and the aggregate are expressed in logarithms. All
variables are in first differences.
***significantat the .01 level
** significantat the .05 level
* significantat the .10 level-19-
III. Three Studies
As a means of illustrating the connection between the changing statistical
relationships documented in Section tI and specific changes in financial market
structure and practice, it is helpful to focus in more detail on three of these
aggregates in particular.
Narrow money. Twodecadesor so ago, the center of attention among
economistsand others who advocated a greater role for monetary aggregates in
the making of U.S. monetary policy was the narrow money stock (Ml), consisting
essentially of currency and demand deposits. The reasons were theoretical,
practical and empirical. The theory of the demand for money for transactions
purposes seemed well worked out, especially in comparison to the more open-ended
issues involved in demand for money as a means of wealth holding. As a
practical matter, it was straight forward that currency and demand deposits were
the two main ways of effecting transactions in the United States. By contrast,
endless debate and ambiguity surrounded any attempt to draw a line separating
what was "money" from what wasn't for portfolio purposes. Finally, although
Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) historical work had used a broader aggregate also
including savings deposits at commercial banks (but not thrifts), widely
publicized studies by Andersen and Jordan (1968), Goldfeld (1973) and others
seemed to point to Ml as the measure exhibiting greatest stability in relation
to income In the United States during the post World War II period.
As a result, Ml usually assumed pride of place in the FOMC's on-again
off-again attempts, beginning in 1970, to incorporate monetary aggregate targets
(or constraints, or provisos) in its regular directives to the trading desk.
When the Committee dramatically adopted new operating procedures in October
1979, much of what the change was all about was a heightened emphasis on
achieving targeted rates of money growth. Again Ml was the main focus of-20-
attention.
At the same time, it was well understood that the then existing structure
ofreserve requirements,under which banks held reserves against not only demand
deposits but also savings deposits, weakened the Federal Reserve's potential
control over Ml. The Federal Reserve in 1978 had proposed a new system of
reserve requirements focused more narrowly on "transactions" balances, and also
introducing reserves against such balances on account at noninember banks and
even at nonbank intermediaries..
6
congress legislated approximately this system
as part of the Monetary Control Act of 1980.
Ironically, just as the Federal Reserve was placing Ml at the center of its
monetary policymaking framework and the Congress was revamping reserve
requirements to make Ml more closely controllable, the relationship between Ml
andnonfinancial economic activity had already begun to break do.rn.Following a
widelydebated episode at the end of the 1973-75 recession, in which business
recovered sharply despite Ml growth that normally would have been consistent
with a much slower advance of nominal income (to the evident consternation of
the Federal Reserve's critics), Coldfeld (1976) added to his earlier paper a
postscript wondering where the "missing money" was. By the time the FOMC
formally abandoned its new operating procedures, Judd and Scadding (1982) were
already in print with a survey article citing more than eighty papers onthe
apparent demise of the money demand function and the ongoingeffort to
rescussitate it.
As Figure 3 shows however, these events of the jd to late 1970s,
troublesome as they were at the time, now appear as mere blips compared towhat
has happened since. The reason, presumably, is the revolution in waysof
effecting transactions that began with the introduction of NO accounts(in New
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Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, and has since continued with
the introduction of "debit cards."
Few people would have expected the demand for any transactions centered
monetary aggregate to remain unaffected by these developments (the Federal
Reserve redefined Ml, together with the other standard aggregates, in 1980), but
many failed to anticipate the full extent of the collapse of Ml's relationship
to both income and prices. For example, well after the Federal Reserve had
publicly abandoned its close adherence to money growth targets, Milton Friedman
(1984) argued that the short-run relationship of Ml to nominal income remained
as reliable as before but had merely accelerated the time lag involved, and
moreover that the longer-run relationship of Ml to prices also remained
predictive. As Table 1 shows, however, there is no statistically significant
relationship between Ml and nominal income in the post-1979 data. Table 3 shows
the same for prices. Even the correlation between Ml growth and inflation,
computed in the way Friedman recommended to bring Out the longer-run
relationship (using two-year moving averages to smooth out transitory
fluctuations, and a two-year lag to allow for sluggish price responses), dropped
from .87 during 1959-78 to .10 during 1979-92.
Beginning in 1983, the FOMC not only widened the Ml target rangeit
reported to Congress but also stated explicitly that it was placingless
emphasis on Ml than on broader aggregates. In 1986 the Committeewidened the Ml
target range to five percentage points. In 1987 theCom.mittee gave up reporting
any Ml range at all.
Broad credit. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, I wrote aseries of
papers showing that the total outstanding debt ofall nonfinancial U.S. obligors
bore a relationship to nominal income comparable to that for anyof the standard
monetary aggregates (see again the 1960-79 columnof Table Atthe most-22-
basic level, the motivation for this effort was the fact that skeletal
macroeconomic models like those of Tobin (1969) or Brunner and Meltzer (1972)
conveyed no a priori presumption that one side of any sector's balance sheet be
more intimately related than the other side to its nonfinancial activity.
Liabilities could be just as relevant as assets. At a more substantive level,
many of the disparate strands of what has since come to be called the "credit
view" of monetary policy at least had in common a focus on economic agents'
ability to borrow.
Two aspects of this work were somewhat surprising, however, especially in
the context of "credit view" thinking. First, the debt aggregate that bore a
statistically significant relationship to income --thatis, the aggregate whose
fluctuations tended to anticipate future movements of income -- includedboth
the debt of private-sector borrowers and government debt (unlike the
corresponding private-sector-only measure, a form of which had for some time
been an element of the standard index of leading indicators). Second, in
contrast to the usual "credit view" implication that there is something special
about the debt of banks, or perhaps of banks together with other credit granting
intermediaries, total credit consistently outperformed any bank-based measure in
statistical tests of a relationship to income. While these specifics raised
some puzzles to be explained, that did not take away from the fact that at least
one measure of the economy's liabilities was as closely related to nonfinancial
economic activity as any measure of its assets that could be labeled "money."
When a central bank uses an explicit intermediate target as the focus of
monetary policy, there can be only one such target.8 But when the central bank
uses variables like money as information variables, there is no reason to limit
the procedure to just one. Given the roughly equivalent performance of total
credit with any of the standard M's in providing information about subsequent-23-
fluctuations of income, the conclusion I drew from these results was that if the
FOMC were going to use a monetary aggregate to guide monetary policy it should
use total credit for this purpose. Not only were two sources of
information likely to be better than one, b't one monetary aggregate together
with one credit aggregate also seemed preferable to using two different monetary
aggregates in tandem (which some people at the time were suggesting). Using
both a monetary aggregate and a credit aggregate would broaden the range of
information thus brought to bear on the monetary policy process to encompass
nonfinancial agents' liability-issuing behavior as well as their asset-holding
behavior. In 1983 the FOMC began to include in its reports to Congress a
monitoring range for total credit (which it calls "domestic nonfinancial debt).
and it has done so ever since.
As Table I shows, the collapse of the relationship between credit and
nonfinancial economic activity has been just as dramatic as that for any measure
of money. Figure 4 further illustrates the enormous break with prior
debt-issuing patterns that began not long after the 1981-82 recession ended.
Roughly one-third of the rise since then in total credit compared to income has
reflected the federal government's by-now chronic fiscal imbalance. The dozen
years since 1980 comprise the only sustained period since the foundingof the
Republic in which the U.S. Government's outstanding debt has risen faster than
the national income. In 1980 the government's debt amounted to 26 cents for
every dollar of U.S. gross domestic product. By 1993 it was53 cents.
The other two-thirds of the increase in total debt in relation to income
reflects the borrowing of both businesses and households. While the
government's rising debt is a matter of fiscal policy (at least in the first
instance), the explosion of private-sector borrowing is very much the stuff of


































































































































































in this regard have been in the business arena, where the wave of leveraged
buy-outs, debt-financed acquisitions and stock repurchases that dominated
corporate America during much of the 1980s clearly stands as an object of
interest in its ownright.So too does the development of the "junk"bond
market, which made so many of these transactions possible. Between 1984 and
1989 U.S. nonfinancial corporations borrowed (net of repayments) over $1
trillion. Roughly $600 billion of that went into transactions that extinguished
the equity either of the borrowing corporations themselves or of other companies
they were acquiring.
Market structures and practices affecting household borrowing have changed
as well. Themostobvious and presumably the most important example here is the
securitization of residential mortgages, already discussed above. The markets
have also securitized other household sector liabilities, however, including
automobile loans ("CARS") and credit card obligations ("CARDS"). These changes
have clearly increased households' ability to borrow. Examples of institutional
change that have plausibly increased households' willinEness to borrow include
the relaxation of bankruptcy requirements in various states. (By contrast,
changes in the tax code since 1980 have mostly reduced the attractiveness of
borrowing by individuals.)
In light of these pervasive changes affecting government, business and
households, the collapse of the credit-to income relationship documented in
Table 1 and Figure 4 is hardly astonishing.
broad money. To the extent that support exists today for the use of any of
the conventional monetary aggregates as an intermediate target for monetary
policy, the aggregate of choice seems to be the broad money stock(M2).9 Within
the Federal Reserve System, Feinman and Porter (1992) have argued on empirical
grounds that M2 demand not only is more stable than the demand for other-25-
standardM's but also that M2 outperforms potential new candidate measures (for
example, what others have called "liquid M2," consisting of currency plus all
deposits in M2 that can be redeemed at par on demand). OutsidetheFederal
Reserve, Ramey (1993) and Feldstein and Stock (1993) have argued that different
forms of error correction procedures render stable the ratio of M2 to money (or,
in recipriocal form, the mis-named M2 "velocity"). In recent years the Federal
Reserve's reports to Congress under the Humphrey-Hawkins legislation have also
attached more importance to M2 than to other aggregates, at times suggesting
that relationships based on M2 may now be settling into a new, more usefully
exploitable stability after a period of disequilibrium due to changing market
structures.
The performance of M2 during the most recent business cycle has been
anything but reassuring, however. As Figure 5 shows, 142 growth peaked in late
1986 and by yesrend 1987 had slowed to rates that would normally represent a
strong prediction of recession. Growth of 142 revived in 1988, faltered again in
early 1989, but then revived even more strongly beginning in mid 1989 onward, so
that by the time the recession began at midyear 1990 M2 was giving the opposite
signal. Throughout this period 142 gave false signals broadly similar to those
given by other familiar business cycle indicators like the federal funds rate,
the slope of the yield curve, and the spread between the commercial paper rate
and the Treasury bill rate. As is evident in Figure 5, however, the difficulty
with 142 has also persisted well into the recovery, with slow 142 growth more
suggestive of renewed economic downturn than of even the modest recovery that
has taken place.
Figure 6, updated from Feinman and Porter (1992), makes the 142 growth
puzzle more specific by plotting 142 "velocity" against the Federal Reserve's





























































































































































































































































































difference between the weighted-average return paid on the various components of
M2 and a weighted-average return on short-term market instruments not included
in M2. Clearly something has changed since 1988. Feininan and Porter showed
that expanding the set of market instruments considered to be alternatives to M2
(and, importantly, choosing weights on those instruments' returns that
retrospectively maximized their explanatory power) reduced the magnitude of the
recent discrepancy but did not eliminate it.
Put in the simplest way, the point of Feinman and Porter's suggested
improvement in the analysis of 112 demand is that depositors may consider not
just short-term money market instruments but bonds too, and perhaps even
equities, as potential alternatives to the deposit components of M2. The
conceptual point is hardly new,'° but there is reason to believe that market
conditions as well as the institutional response to those conditions has given
it new practical relevance within just the past few years.
As Figure 7 shows, the spread between long-term and short-term interest
rates has been extraordinarily wide during the latest recession and recovery
episode. Holders of maturing certificates of deposit therefore face a large gap
between the rates at which they can renew their deposits and the current yields
on bonds. (Whether those current yields correspond to plausible expectations of
the relevant expected holding returns is more difficult to say.) At the same
time that M2 has been puzzlingly weak, flows of household funds into bonds and
stocks, and especially into bond and stock mutual funds, have been unusually
large. Net purchases of bonds and other debt instruments by mutual funds
totaled $90 billion in 1991 and $132 billion in 1992, compared to $33 billion
per year on average during the previous decade. Net purchases of equities by
mutual funds were $45 billion in 1991 and $67 billion in 1992 versus a previous





















































































































































































































































































markets may also have been an influence in this regard, in that sales of mutual
funds investing in foreign bonds and stocks have grown particularly rapidly
(albeit from a small base).
Not surprisingly, banks have responded to this competition by joining it.
A Federal Reserve survey of 56 large banks in March 1993 indicated that 52 of
them offered mutual fund products to their customers, presumably as a way of at
least keeping the depositor if not the deposit. Roughly one-third of these
banks had begun retail sales of mutual funds just since 1990. Three-fourths of
the banks marketing mutual funds as of March 1993 had sales representatives
located on site at their branches; before 1990 half of these had no sales
personnel available on a daily basis. The median percentage of branches with
available sales personnel has gone from 20% in 1990 to 90% in 1993. Among those
banks that could estimate the sources of mutual fund purchases, one-third to
two-thirds apparently came directly from their own deposits.12
In addition to disrupting whatever relationships between M2 and
nonfinancial economic activity may previously have existed (which in itself
would be damaging enough), these latest changes in market structure and practice
have two implications that are especially subversive of any attempt by the FOMC
to use M2 as an intermediate target for monetary policy. First, the existence
of an active, quantitatively substantial margin of substitution beti..'een any
measure of "money" and long-term assets greatly complicates the Committee's task
of controlling that aggregate. Indeed, as long as the aggregate in question
consists mostly of short-term interest bearing instruments, it could even chanze
thdirectionof the aggregate's response to open market operations.
Suppose, for example, that the OpenMarketCommittee seeks to increase the
rate of M2 growth (perhaps because, as in recent experience, actual growth has
fallen below the targeted range). The presumptive action by the trading desk is-28-
to buy securities, thereby adding tonooborrowed reserves and lowering the
federal funds rate and, via the market's response,other short-term interest
rates. The conventional expectation,based on the assumption of sluggish or
even fixed deposit rates in contrast to quick-movingmarket rates, is an
increase in money demand. ut if deposit ratesdecline roughly in step with
short-term market rates, and if substitution betweendeposits and longer-term
assets is quantitatively important, the demandfor money may actually dcc' me
unless (or until) the fall in short-term rates induces amatching fall in
expected returns on the relevant long-term assets.
As the Appendix to this section shows more formally, usingthe illustration
of a simple model of money demand, money supply, income
determination and the
term structure of interest rates, whether "expansionary" openmarket operations
(that is, open market purchases) actually expand M2 orshrink it depends on
relationships amongparameters,importantly including interest elasticities,the
estimation of which lies well beyond the scope of this paper.How sharply the
FOMC's staff has estimated those parameters (and theirvariance-COvariance
structure) is an interesting matter about which to speculate.I conjecture that
in the currently prevailing circumstances the Committee does notknow with
confidence even the .jgfl, not to mention the magnitude, of theshort-run
response of M2 to open market operations.
The other seriously damaging implication of the newsubstitutability
between M2 and equity amd bond mutual funds is that flowsinto or out of M2 may
in the future assume the volatility that in the past hasbeen more
characteristic of securities markets. In the case of bondfunds in particular,
no one knows whether the individuals who havecashed in their certificates of
deposit to buy these funds have done so with afull appreciation of the risk
properties of these longer-term assets. Host open-endmutual funds are-29-
essentially as liquid as deposits, in that holders can cash in their shares on
notice. But liquidity is not the same as risk, and depending on the specific
assets in the fund, the properties may differ sharply from guaranteed
redemption at par. If at some point the new holders of bond funds suddenly
discover that their shares are subject to downward price variation, redemptions
triggered by a rise in long-term interest rates could easily lead to a "noise'
surge in K2 demand sufficient to overwhelm any "signal' the OpenMarket
Committee would hope to exploit by using M2 as an intermediate target.
In its mid-year report to Congress under the Humphrey-Hawkins procedure, in
July 1993. the Federal Reserve "downgraded" the role of M2 in the monetary
policymaking process, acknowledging that 'relationships between money and
- 13 income, and between money and the price level have largely broken down.'.30-
IV.Jmplications the Conduct j Monetary Policy
The main lesson to be drawn from this survey of changing relationships
between familiar financial aggregates and income and prices isthat there is
little basis for expecting the FOMC (or anyne else, for that matter)to
identify any time soon a new, stable relationship that cancommand the degree of
confidence that was once optimistically attached to any of a varietyof such
aggregates, and that is required to place that relationshipat the center of the
monetary policymaking process. The point is not justthe now-familiar finding
that statistical exercises devoid of behavioral content show a breakdownin
prior relationships. It is that this breakdown, in one caseafter another, has
plausibly had its origin in changing financial market structuresand practices
and in the response to those changes on the part of households and business.
To be sure, jf the financial markets stopped changing, then in time
relationships of the kind that monetary policymakers can perhaps use to devise
intermediate targets might well emerge. But why expect that to happen? A
decade ago, when attention in this context mostly focused on Ml, it was perhaps
plausible to attribute changing money-to-income relationships primarily to
changes in government regulation, and from that assumption to inferthat these
relationships would again stabilize as the abrupt regulatory changes of the
early 1980s receded into the past. But the point of the discussionabove of
credit and M2 is that further change, on about as great a scale, took place
again in the mid to late l980s (in the case of credit) and againin the late
1980s to early 1990s (in the case of M2).
Moreover, even if the financial markets did stop changing, and one or more
newly stable relationships of this kind were to emerge, how longwould it then
take to identify those relationships khitativelv uantitativ1i? As
the literature of the subject over the past two decades has amplydemonstrated,-31-
figuring out which definition of "money" (in other words, which collection of
inherently quite different instruments) bears the most reliable relationship to
income or prices is already hard enough. But for such a relationship to be
genuinely useful for policy purposes, the Open Market Committee also needs to
know, at least to some reasonable approximation, its quantitative dimensions:
Does this aggregate grow in proportion to income, or more so or less So? How
sensitive is it to interest rates? (And which interest rates?) How different
are the comovements that occur over six months from those that prevail over two
years? For the foreseeable future, such difficult but absolutely essential
quantitative description is just not in the offing, at least not with any
serious level of confidence.
What, then, is the FOMC to do? One possibility, of course. is simply to
fall back on whatever the Committee knows about the connections to income and
prices of the instrument the trading desk sets directly -- nonborrowedreserves
or the federal funds rate -- andmake policy decisions on the basis of those
ultimate relationships without drawing on any other direct inputs to the policy
process, gut because the lags between Federal Reserve actions and their
ultimate economic consequences are fairly long (at least according to most
estimates), such a bare-bones framework is inherently unsatisfying. Simply to
wait it out until the full effects of any change in the funds rate have worked
their way through to nonfinancial activity, before determining whether the new
level is appropriate or not, is likely to be tantamount, in too many instances,
to letting the damage accumulate.
The FOMC's central need in this situation is information: information
about the economy's current State and its future direction, as well as about the
effects of the Federal Reserve's ownactions.And in an economic and financial
environment so dominated by ongoing change, that information is harder to come-32-
by than ever. One implication of this basic description of the problem is that
the monetary policymaking process needs to incorporate information inclusively,
rather than focusing narrowly on any one variable (which would amount to
discarding information from other sources). Aparallelimplication is that the
policymaking process needs to exploit information intensively, through frequent
re-examinations of just what the information provided by any one source is
saying.
More specifically, the inclusive use of information presumably means using
as information variables (in the sense of Section 1 above) not just several
financial aggregates rather than only one but a broader, and potentially much
broader, range of measures with potential predictive context. For example,
several Federal Reserve researchers have analyzed the predictive properties of
the slope of the yield curve (that is, the term structure of interest rates)
with respect to real economic activity.14 and Mishkin (1990) has documented at
least modest predictive capacity of some parts of the yield curve with respect
to prices. Similarly, Kuttner and I have shown that the spread between the
coimercial paper rate and the Treasury bill rate contains substantial
information about subsequent movements of real activity, albeit not about
prices)5 Indeed, the paper-bill spread typically remains highly significant in
equations for real income even when other variables like money and credit are
introduced, and those other variables usually lose their significance altogether
in the presence of the paper-bill spread.
No one would suggest using the yield curve slope or the paper-bill spread
as an intermediate target of monetary policy. But once the policymaking
procedure is framed in terms of information variables, rather than an
intermediate target, there is no reason why interest rate relationships are any
less suitable for this purpose than monetary aggregates. Just as wth a-33.
monetary aggregate, the Open Market Committee can think through in advance how
the yield curve and the paper-bill spread are likely tomove over the coming
months if its policy actions are having the intended effect and ifnonfinancial
activity is developing as expected. And just as with amonetary aggregate, a
sufficiently large unanticipated movement of the yield curve or the paper-bill
spread could be the occasion for questioning whether economicactivity, either
as affected by monetary policy or in other regards, is in factdeveloping
according to plan. That, in short, is what the information variable procedure
for monetary policy is all about.
There is also no analytical reason to restrict the Committee'sset of
formally exploited information variables to quantities or prices drawn
exclusively from the financial world. Many of the observable actions thatare
intermediate between what monetary policy does and what ithopes ultimately to
achieve take place in the sphere of real activity. Conventionalleading
indicator indices have always exploited the fact thatgoods orders, building
permits, ground breakings and the like typically precede thecorresponding final
sales and production that account for much of aneconomy's output and income
(although less so as the share of services in total output rises)-Incontrast
to the unstructured use of such variables as mere leading indicators, however,
for purposes of monetary policy the relevant question is also what information
they contain about how effects attributable to Federal Reserve actions
themselves are spreading through the economy. As is true in the case of
financial quantities and prices, therefore, there is room --indeed,there is
need -- tochoose such variables in part according to how they fit into the
Committee's conception of how monetary policy affects economic activity.
As a practical matter, however, it is likely that much of the substantive
advantage to be gained from exploiting specific nonfinancial variables as formal-34-
information variables for monetary policy is already implicit in the FONC's
existing economic forecasting apparatus. If durable goods orders, or housing
starts, or container shipments move in ways seriously at odds with the
Committee's expectations for overall activity consistent with its policy stance.
under current procedures that fact is unlikely to escape attention and, if
warranted, close analysis. As a result, much of the concrete advantage of an
explicit information variable procedure probably lies in a more inclusive
exploitation of financial quantities and prices.
It is important to emphasize, however, that broadening the array of
financial quantities and prices used as information variables does not guarantee
superior ex post policy actions and outcomes. As Figures 8 and 9 show, for
example, in the period leading up to the 1990-91 recession both the paper-bill
spread and the yield curve slope gave false signals similar to those documented
for ff2 in Figure 5. The paper-bill spread fluctuated at levels normally
predictive of a recession from mid 1987 to mid 1989, then narrowed sufficiently
to eliminate any indication of recession by the beginning of 1990 and did not
widen again until after the recession had begun. The yield curve was a somewhat
better predictor in this episode, flattening in 1988 and throughout 1989, but by
early 1990 it had begun to steepen again while the recession was still a half a
year away. (A widening paper-bill spread typically precedes recessions, as does
a flattening yield curve.)
One interpretation of these events is simply that the paper-bill spread and
the yield curve slope are, not surprisingly, imperfect as predictors of future
economic activity.16 An alternative indication, suggested by the work of a
variety of recent researchers, is that these variables (like ff2, perhaps) are
not so much predictors of economic activity as indicators of the stance of




























































that the 1990-91 recession was due to causes other than monetary policy (for
example, the widely discussed "capital crunch" at banks and other lending
institutions17). Much useful research remains to be done in orderto establish,
both for variables like these spreads and for more conventional variables like
M2, in which of these differing lights to construe them. The distinction is
central to their appropriate use in formulating and carrying outmonetary
policy.
Regardless of the outcome of that investigation, however, the demonstrable
fallibility of variables like the paper-bill spread and the yield curve as
predictors of economic activity illustrates in yet another context the advantage
of using any such measures as information variables, not intermediatetargets.
Unlike as with an intermediate target, an unexpected movement of an information
variable does not automatically trigger a change In policy In the sense of a new
federal funds rate or altered growth of nonborrowed reserves. It instead
creates the presumption that there is an issue to be addressed. There remains.
always the need for a judgment. This central role of case-by-case discretion
in responding to the pertinent information that arises does not mean, of course,
that the FOMC should ignore the longer-run consequences of its actions.18 It
does mean, however, that ir carrying out whatever its appropriate long-run
strategy may be, the Committee needs to make judgments about whether or not the
movements of specific observed variables imply that it has gone off course and
needs to take corrective action.
In principle, one could perhaps imagine a policy rile, based on some
sufficiently complex form of intermediate target, that would internally embody
just these kinds of judgments. After all, unless the FOMO acts in a purely
random way, its monetary policy decisions do systematically reflect the
Committee's economic objectives and its understanding of how any specific action-36-
that it may take or not will affect the economic behavior to which those
objectives relate. For practical purposes, however --asTobin (1983) and
others have emphasized --"rules"in this context inevitably mean simple rules,
not elaborate interrelationships involving large numbers of variables and
multiple contingencies. Given the complexity of the relationships involved, a
"rule" that fully reflected the Committee's decision making process would
probably be impossible to write down. By contrast, for practical purposes of
monetary policy a "rule" is not a rule unless it can be written down in one
paragraph and readily explained to audiences consisting of business executives
and Congressmen. Hence the need for case-by-case judgments, as new information
emerges, is real.
Finally, it should also be clear that those judgments are best made
frequently. Even the most reliable information variable can begin to give false
signals, and changing financial market structures and practices can distort
(compared to prior experience) the content of even those signals that continue
to be informative. The experience of the last decade or so, as documented at
some length and in some detail in Sections 11 and III above, provides ample
evidence of just this phenomenon. Is it possible to know in advance that any
chosen variable will necessarily provide misleading information? Of course not.
But that does not cc,nstitute grounds for proceeding under a strict presumption
that it will not, as is inherent either in an intermediate target procedure or
in any procedure calling for automatic responses to unexpected movements of
selected information variables. The presumption, instead, is that there are
questions to be raised and responses to be undertaken or not in light of the
best available answers. Precisely because the financial market structures and
practices that matter in this regard are as subject to change as they have been
in this latest period, assuming that yesterday's answer is still right today isat best an invitation to error.
-37--38-
V. FundamentalIssues
Finally, even if the Open Market Committee devises a successful system for
formulating monetary policy, based on a more inclusive explicit use of financial
price and quantity variables and a more intensive procedure for responding to
the information that these variables contain, the ongoing evolution of the U.S.
financial markets as discussed in Section II nonetheless raises a broader --
indeed,a more fundamental -- issuefor monetary policymaking.
The most straightforward way to frame that issue is simply to ask why what
the Federal Reserve System does matters in the first place. More specifically,
in a $6 trillion economy with more than $25 trillion of financial claims
outstanding in highly liquid markets where many of those claims change ownership
not just easily but frequently, why should it matter whether the Federal Reserve
buys $1 billion worth of securities or $10 billion worth in the course of an
entire year? How can such a small difference matter even for the pricing of
government securities, of which there are nearly $5 trillion outstanding, or,
all the more so, for the pricing of marketable debt securities more generally,
of which there are more than $12 trillion? How especially can such a small
difference in Federal Reserve transactions exert a meaningful influence on such
matters as how much people choose to work or spend, or how many houses people
build, or how many factories firms put up, or how much businesses produce and
how they price it?
The answer, of course, is that the Federal Reserve is a monopolist. It and
it alone can create the reserves that, by law, banks and other depository
institutions must hold. Its purchases of securities do just that. And relative
to the existing amount of bank reserves ($57 billion at midyear 1993) ,$1
billion versus $10 billion growth in a year is a major difference.
But being a monopolist matters only if the item over which the monopoly-39.
applies is tself important. Whatifbanks (and other depository institutions)
can just as easily carry Out their activities -- extendingcredit arid taking
deposits --withoutincremental reserves? Arid even if they can't, what if there
are other institutions, like finance companies that issue credit and money
market mutual funds that take deposits, to do so in their place?
Questions like these have been the stuff of monetary policy economics
virtually since the subject's inception. The traditionally accepted answers
have been that, at least at some margin, banks cannot extend credit and take
deposits without incremental reserves on the same terms that they would
otherwise establish, and that, for at least some would-be borrowers and/or
depositors, other institutions cannot perform these functions on the same terms
that would otherwise be available from banks.19 Within that prevailing
understanding, the ongoing debate has then focused on such subsidiary questions
as whether it is the credit side of the story or the deposit side that primarily
matters, whether monetary policy actions (through whatever mechanism) affect
prices alone or real economic activity as well, and which specific institutions
andinstruments and aspects of nonfinancial activity are more central to the
processthan others.
By contrast, if having reserves or not is no longer important to banks, or
if other lending and deposit creating institutions can readily take their place,
then the Federal Reserve's monopoly over bank reserves no longer matters. And
once it does not, no one can plausibly expect even an institution with a $350
billion portfolio (as of June 1993) to govern the evolution of prices and
quantities in a $26 trillion market, much less to exert a meaningful impact on
nonfinancial economic activity.
In the United States over the last decade or so, the value of the Federal
Reserve System's monopoly has apparently eroded in two senses. One, noted in-40-
Section III, is that because the current system of reserve requirements dates to
the era (actually not so long ago) when advocates thought close control over Ml
was the key to a successful monetary policy, the majority of liabilities issued
by banks and other depository intermediaries are exempt from reserves. In the
absence of incremental reserves, banks can and regularly do fund incremental
credit creation by issuing certificates of deposit or other non-reserve-bearing
instruments. This situation is readily correctable, at least in principle,
although as a practical matter difficult questions of definition cong forms of
obligations (direct versus holding company, on-shore versus off-shore, insured
versus uninsured, senior versus subordinated, and so on) would inevitably arise.
So too would problems of the competitiveness of the depository intermediary
industry as a whole.
20 The harder problem is the one discussed in Section II. The role of
depository institutions collectively is shrinking in relation to the broader job
being done by the financial markets overall. Without substantial empirical
research that lies well beyond the scope of this paper, it is impossible to say
just how small the depository institution sector can become, relative to
economy-wide wealth holding or credit creation or saving and investment, before
the Federal Reserve's monopoly even over reserves that might be imposed against
the complete liability side of the entire sector's balance sheet would lose its
force in a broader market context. Still less is it possible to say how the
Federal Reserve should then seek to expand its powers -- "reserves"in some form
for financial institutions other than depository intermediaries? centralized
coordination of capital requirements for all lenders? -- inorder to
re-establish its ability to influence market-wide financial and, ultimately,
nonfinancial outcomes. But the direction of the trends shown in Figure 1 andespecially Figure 2 is clear, and if they continue, then at some point more
fundanental questions like these will inevitably move to the forefront.-42-
Avoendix to Section LU:Th Response21 to Qç Narket Operations
The question at issue is whether an expansionary open market operation --
thatis, an increase in nonborrowed reserves --causesM2 to increase or
decrease. As a simple illustration, consider the following compact. nondynamic
model of money, interest rates and nonfinancial economic activity:
(Al) money demand: Mt —o
++ a2r
-a3rL
(A2) money supply: M — + +
(A3)term structure: rL —+ 7lrS+72rS.
(A4) aggregate demand: ''
—- 6r
-
whereM is the money stock, Y is nominal income, R is the quantity of
nonborrowed reserves, and r and rL are short- and long-term interest rates,
respectively.(In the term structure equation, r t+i indicates the expectation
of short-term interest rates in the future.) All coefficients are assun,ed to
be positive.
If the impact on the short-term interest rate is seen as temporary, the







Ifthe impact on the short-term rate is seen as permanent, the effecton money
is




+ + 12)(03+ 0182)
Intraditional models of money demand, in which money is assumed to beara
fixed (perhaps zero) return and bothr and rL represent competing returns on
non-money market assets, 2 would have the opposite sign (that is,2 as written
would be negative), and so >0unanibiguously ir. either (AS) or (A7). But for
the current situation of t12,r is more plausibly the o return. In that case
0 as a161 +11(03
+
0162)2 in the case of the temporary effect on
short-term rates (A5, A6) or, analogously 0 as 0161 + + 12)(a3 +
0182)a2 in the case of the permanent effect (A7, A8).
This ambiguity prevails even in a short run sufficiently short thatopen
market operations do not yet affect nonfinancial economicactivity, so that Y is
effectively predetermined with respect to M. Replacing (A4) above by
(A4') aggregate demand: —S -61r
-S2rLl
simplifies (A6) and (AS) to-44-
(A6') Z — - a2
(A8') Z — + a3
-
Here 0 as a2 or as +
a3 respectively.
Needless to say, moving beyond this simple model, either by making these
four equations dynaiicorby adding further equations, makes the sign condition
on more complicated rather than simpler.Footnotes
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1. In light of the long-standing debate over whether or notmoney "causes"
income, a key feature of such an information variable procedure is that it
involves no presumption of causality. All that isnecessary is a lead in
timing, whether causal or not. See Tobin (1970) for an early and concise
discussion of this distinction.
2.See, for example, Simpson (1984). See also the paper by Franklin Edwards
in this volume.
3. See Friedman and Kuttner (1992, l993b) for further details of the
estimation and for the results of alternative specifications.
4. It is useful to recall, however, that the connection betweenmoney and
prices itself rests on "ad hoc" assumptions about the existence of money
and its role in the economy, so that the familiar contrast to models
involving "ad hoc" impediments to Walrasian equilibrium is, in reality,
less than usually represented.
5. See, for example, the exchange between Stock and Watson (1989) and Friedzran
and Kuttner (1993a). Earlier on, see, for example, Sims (1980) and
Eichenbaum and Singleton (1986).
6. See Federal Reserve ulleti, 64 (July, 1978), 605-610. Thebasicidea
however, was not new then. The Commission on Money and Credit, for
example, made a similar proposal in its 1961 report. A key motivation
underlying this proposed change was to put non-member institutions of the
Federal Reserve System on an equal competitive footing with Federal Reserve
members.
7. See, for example, Friedman (1983).
8.The target can of course be an average, perhaps with unequal weights, of
other variables. (Divisia aggregates, with optimally selected weights, are
an obvious example.) Even a single money growth target is, after all, an
average of growth targets for the composite elements of whatever is defined
as "money," with weights on those elements in proportion to their size.
9. McCallun, (1987, 1988) and others have advocated policy rules centered on
the monetary base; but since the base is subject to direct Federal Reserve
control (and that is a large part of HcCalluni's poi'-t), under such aprocedure it would be the instrument of monetary policy, not an
intermediate target.
10.Earlyexamples of arguments that bond and/or equity returns in principle
affect money demand include Friedman (1956). Heltzer (1963) and Brainard
and Tobin (1968). See also Friedman (1977) and Hamburger (1977).
11. Data are from the Flow-of-Funds accounts.
12. See Reid (1993).
13. Allan Greenspan, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives.
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Economic
Growth and Credit Formation, July 20, 1993, pp. 9-10.
16.See, for example, Laurent (1988), Strongin (1990) and Estrella and
Hardouvelis (1991).
15. See again Friedman and Kuttner (1992, 1993b).
16. For example, Friedman and Kuttner (l993b) found that movements in the
relative outstanding supplies of commercial paper and Treasury bills exert
a highly significant effect on the paper-bill spread, as is to be expected
if investors regard paper and bills as imperfect substitutes in their
portfolios. Depending upon the estimate of the elasticity of substitution,
either a small or a large part of the movement of the paper-bill spread
that was not predictive of real output during 1987-90 can be attributed to
the fact that the Treasury sharply cut back its issuance of bills beginning
in early 1987 and then resumed rapid bill issuance iii late 1989.
17.See, for example, Syron (1991).
18. That is sometimes the meaning attached to "discretionary" monetary policy
in the economic literature. See, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983).
19. In the absence of reserve requirements, banks would presumably hold reserve
balances anyway as a means of clearing transactions. If a private transfer
agent provided an alternative clearing system not ultimately resting on
reserves transfers, however, the question of the central bank's potential
ability to affect banks' behavior via open market operations would again
arise. The crucial point is that the central bank maintain a monopoly over
some necessary aspect of the banking system's activity.
20. Also see again the paper by Franklin Edward in this volume. For a more
fundamental perspective on the role of banks in relation to other
intermediaries, and on bank lending in relation to credit provided via open
market securities, see Farna (1980, 1985) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989).References
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